On the semantics of merging by Meyer, Thomas
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
00
30
15
v2
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 8 
M
ar 
20
00
On the semantics of merging
Thomas Meyer
Department of Computer Science
School of Information Technology
University of Pretoria
Pretoria, 0002, South Africa
e-mail: tmeyer@cs.up.ac.za
Abstract
Intelligent agents are often faced with the problem of
trying to merge possibly conflicting pieces of informa-
tion obtained from different sources into a consistent
view of the world. We propose a framework for the
modelling of such merging operations with roots in
the work of Spohn (Spohn 1988; Spohn 1991). Unlike
most approaches we focus on the merging of epistemic
states, not knowledge bases. We construct a num-
ber of plausible merging operations and measure them
against various properties that merging operations
ought to satisfy. Finally, we discuss the connection be-
tween merging and the use of infobases (Meyer 1999;
Meyer, Labuschagne, & Heidema 2000).
Introduction
To be able to operate in its environment it is nec-
essary for an intelligent agent to have a consistent
view of the world. This demand is often complicated
by the fact that such agents receive conflicting pieces
of information from different sources. The process
of combining possibly inconsistent pieces of informa-
tion, known as merging, has many applications and has
started to receive more attention recently (Borgida &
Imielinski 1984; Lin 1996; Baral, Kraus, & Minker 1991;
Baral et al. 1992; Konieczny & Pino-Pe´rez 1998;
Liberatore & Schaerf 1998; Revesz 1993; Revesz 1987;
Subrahmanian 1994). In this paper we propose a frame-
work for the modelling of merging operations. The pro-
posal has its roots in the work of Spohn (Spohn 1988;
Spohn 1991). Unlike most approaches we adopt a de-
scription of merging on the level of epistemic states in-
stead of knowledge bases.
First we give a brief introduction to the merging of
knowledge bases, focussing on the work of Konieczny
and Pino-Pe´rez (Konieczny & Pino-Pe´rez 1998). This
is followed by a description of our framework for the
merging of epistemic states. Then we construct a num-
ber of merging operations and show how they measure
up to proposed properties of merging. Finally, we dis-
cuss links between merging and the infobases of Meyer
(Meyer 1999).
We assume a finitely generated propositional lan-
guage L closed under the usual propositional connec-
tives, and with a classical model-theoretic semantics.
U is the set of interpretations of L and M(α) is the set
of models of α ∈ L. Classical entailment is denoted by
. We use ⊔ to denote the concatenation of lists. We
let xn denote the list consisting of n versions of x. The
length of a list l is denoted by |l|.
Merging knowledge bases
In the spirit of the work of Katsuno and Mendelzon
(Katsuno & Mendelzon 1991), approaches to the merg-
ing of knowledge bases usually represent the beliefs of
an agent as a single wff φ of L, known as a knowledge
base, where φ represents the set of all wffs entailed by
φ. The goal is to construct, from a finite list of such
knowledge bases, an appropriate consistent knowledge
base in some rational fashion. Konieczny and Pino-
Pe´rez (Konieczny & Pino-Pe´rez 1998) have proposed a
general framework for the merging of knowledge bases.
A knowledge list e is a finite list of consistent knowl-
edge bases [φ1, . . . , φ|e|]. Two knowledge lists e1 and e2
are element-equivalent, written as e1 ≈ e2, iff for every
element φ1 of e1 there is a unique element φ2 (position-
wise) of e2 such that φ1 ≡ φ2 and for every element
φ2 of e2 there is a unique element φ1 (position-wise) of
e1 such that φ2 ≡ φ1. A KP-merging operation δ is a
function from the set of all knowledge lists to the set of
all knowledge bases satisfying the following postulates
(the KP-postulates):
(KP1) δ(e) 2 ⊥
(KP2) If
∧|e|
i=1 φi 2 ⊥ then δ(e) =
∧|e|
i=1 φi
(KP3) If e1 ≈ e2 then δ(e1) ≡ δ(e2)
(KP4) If φ1 ∧ φ2  ⊥ then δ([φ1] ⊔ [φ2]) 2 φ1
(KP5) δ(e1) ∧ δ(e2)  δ(e1 ⊔ e2)
(KP6) If δ(e1)∧δ(e2) 2 ⊥ then δ(e1⊔e2)  δ(e1)∧δ(e2)
Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez also distinguish between two
subclasses of merging operations. An arbitration oper-
ation tries to take as many differing opinions as possible
into account, while the intuition associated with major-
ity operations is that the opinion of the majority should
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Figure 1: A pictorial representation of an epistemic list
containing two epistemic states Φ1 and Φ2. The se-
quence of two digits in each cell above indicates the
natural numbers associated with interpretations by the
two epistemic states. A cell containing the sequence
ij indicates the placement of those interpretations as-
signed the value i by Φ1 and assigned the value j by
Φ2.
prevail. They initially propose the following postulates
for arbitration and majority operations.
(arb) ∀n δ(e ⊔ φn) = δ(e ⊔ [φ])
(maj) ∃n δ(e ⊔ φn)  φ
It turns out that there is no KP-merging operation sat-
isfying (arb). Unlike Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez we are
of the opinion that it is not (arb) that is at fault, but
some of the KP-postulates. Below we argue against the
inclusion of (KP4) and (KP6) as postulates that need
to be satisfied by all merging operations.
Merging epistemic states
In this section we discuss merging on the level of epis-
temic states. We see an epistemic state as providing
a plausibility ranking of the interpretations of L; the
lower the number assigned to an interpretation, the
more plausible it is deemed to be.
Definition 0.1 An epistemic state Φ is a function from
U to the set of natural numbers. Given an epistemic
state Φ, the knowledge base associated with Φ, denoted
by φΦ, is some α ∈ L such thatM(α) = {u | Φ(u) = 0}.
✷
This representation of an epistemic state and its asso-
ciated knowledge base can be traced back to the work
of Spohn (Spohn 1988; Spohn 1991). It should be clear
that an epistemic state with an inconsistent associated
knowledge base still contains useful information.
An epistemic list E = [ΦE1 , . . . ,Φ
E
|E|] is a finite list of
epistemic states. It is instructive to view an epistemic
list pictorially as in figure 1. While such a pictorial
view is only useful in representing epistemic lists con-
taining two elements, it serves as a good foundation for
understanding the principles underlying the merging of
epistemic states in general.
For any epistemic state Φ, let
min(Φ) = min{Φ(u) | u ∈ U}
let
max(Φ) = max{Φ(u) | u ∈ U}
and for an epistemic list E, let
max(E) = max{max(ΦEi ) | 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|}.
For an epistemic list E and u ∈ U we let minE(u) be
equal to
min{ΦEi (u) | 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|}
and we let maxE(u) be equal to
max{ΦEi (u) | 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|}.
We denote by seq(E) the set of all sequences of length
|E| of natural numbers, ranging from 0 to max(E). We
denote by seq≤(E) the subset of seq(E) of all sequences
that are ordered non-decreasingly, and by seq≥(E) the
subset of seq(E) of all sequences that are ordered non-
increasingly. For u ∈ U , we let sE(u) be the sequence
containing the natural numbers ΦE1 (u), . . . ,Φ
E
|E|(u) in
that order, we let sE≤(u) be the sequence s
E(u) or-
dered non-decreasingly, and we let sE≥(u) be the se-
quence sE(u) ordered non-increasingly. Clearly sE(u) ∈
seq(E), sE≤(u) ∈ seq≤(E) and s
E
≥(u) ∈ seq≥(E). Given
any set seq of finite sequences of natural numbers and
a total preorder ⊑ on seq, we define the function
Ωseq⊑ : seq → {0, . . . , |seq| − 1} by assigning natural
numbers to the elements of seq in the order imposed by
⊑, starting by assigning 0 to the elements lowest down
in ⊑. We denote the lexicographic ordering on seq by
⊑lex.
A merging operation on epistemic states ∆ is a func-
tion from the set of all non-empty epistemic lists to the
set of all epistemic states. We propose the following
basic properties for the merging of epistemic states:
(E1) ∃u s.t. ∆(E)(u) = 0
(E2) If ΦEi (u) = Φ
E
j (u) ∀i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ |E|
and sE≤(u) ⊏lex s
E
≤(v) then ∆(E)(u) < ∆(E)(v)
(E3) If ΦEi (u) ≤ Φ
E
i (v) ∀i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |E| then
∆(E)(u) ≤ ∆(E)(v)
(E4) If ∆(E)(u) ≤ ∆(E)(v) then ΦEi (u) ≤ Φ
E
i (v) for
some i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|
(E1) is a restatement of (KP1) and (E2) generalises
(KP2). (E3) states that if all epistemic states in E
agree that u is at least as plausible as v, then so should
the resulting epistemic state. (E4) expects justification
for regarding an interpretation u as at least as plausible
as v: there has to be at least one epistemic state in E
which regards u as at least as plausible as v. The follow-
ing fundamental principle for the merging of epistemic
states follows easily from (E3):
(Unit) If ΦEi (u) = Φ
E
i (v) ∀i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|
then ∆(E)(u) = ∆(E)(v)
(Unit) requires interpretations that are treated identi-
cally by all epistemic states in an epistemic list to be
treated identically in the epistemic state resulting from
a merging operation.
Two epistemic lists E1 and E2 are element-equivalent,
written as E1 ≈ E2, iff for every element Φ1 of E1
there is a unique element Φ2 (position-wise) of E2 such
that Φ1 = Φ2 and for every element Φ2 of E2 there
is a unique element Φ1 (position-wise) of E1 such that
Φ2 = Φ1. The following property is a generalisation of
(KP3). It requires merging to be commutative.
(Comm) E1 ≈ E2 implies ∆(E1) = ∆(E2)
We do not think that (Comm) should hold for all merg-
ing operations. Instead, (Comm) should be seen as a
postulate picking out an interesting subclass of merging
operations.
For a finite list of epistemic lists E = [E1, . . . , E|E|],
let ∆(E) denote the epistemic list [∆(E1), . . . ,∆(E|E|)].
We consider the following properties:
(E5) If ∆(Ei)(u) ≤ ∆(Ei)(v) ∀i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|
then ∆(
⊔|E|
i=1Ei)(u) ≤ ∆(
⊔|E|
i=1 Ei)(v)
(E6) If ∆(
⊔|E|
i=1 Ei)(u) ≤ ∆(
⊔|E|
i=1 Ei)(v) then for some
i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|, ∆(Ei)(u) ≤ ∆(Ei)(v) for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|
(E5) generalises (E3) and (E6) generalises (E4). In fact,
(E5) also implies (KP5).
The arbitration postulate (arb) and the majority pos-
tulate (maj) can be generalised as follows:
(Arb) ∀n ∆(E ⊔ [Φ])(u) = ∆(E ⊔ Φn)(u)
(Maj) ∃n s.t. ∀u, v ∈ U, Φ(u) ≤ Φ(v) if ∆(E ⊔
Φn)(u) ≤ ∆(E ⊔ Φn)(v)
We have not provided a generalised version of (KP4).
The reason is that we do not regard it as a suitable pos-
tulate for merging. Our basic argument is that the mod-
els of a knowledge base associated with an epistemic
state Φ1 may sometimes be given such an implausible
ranking by an epistemic state Φ2 that it would seem
reasonable to exclude all these models from the models
of φ∆([Φ1]⊔[Φ2]). It is worthwhile noting that none of the
merging operations we consider below satisfies (KP4).
Similarly, we have not provided a generalised version
of (KP6) since we regard it as too strong a condition
to impose on all merging operations.1 Below we shall
encounter a number of reasonable merging operations
which do not satisy (KP6).
Constructing merging operations
Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez (Konieczny & Pino-Pe´rez
1998) discuss several merging operations on knowledge
bases using Dalal’s measure of distance between inter-
pretations (Dalal 1988). For any two interpretations u
and v, let dist(u, v) denote the number of propositional
1(E6) can be regarded as a generalised version of a weaker
form of (KP6), but (KP6) does not follow from (E6).
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Figure 2: A representation of the merging operation
∆ls. The number in a cell represents the numbers that
the appropriate merging operation assigns to the inter-
pretations contained in that cell before normalisation.
atoms on which u and v differ. The distance Dist(φ, u)
between a knowledge base φ and an interpretation u is
defined as follows: Dist(φ, u) = min{dist(u, v) | v ∈
M(φ)}. It is clear that this distance measure can be
used to define an epistemic state Φ as follows:
∀u ∈ U, Φ(u) = Dist(φ, u).
It is easily seen that Φ(u) = 0 iff u ∈ M(φ) and there-
fore φΦ ≡ φ. Many of the merging operations on epis-
temic states that we propose below are appropriate gen-
eralisations of these merging operations on knowledge
bases.
When reading through the remainder of this section,
the reader should observe that the construction of every
merging operation consists of two steps. In the first step
natural numbers are assigned to interpretations. After
the completion of this step it will often be the case that
none of the interpretations have been assigned the value
0. To ensure compliance with (E1) the second step
performs an appropriate uniform subtraction of values
which we shall refer to as normalisation.
Arbitration
Inspired by an arbitration operation proposed by Liber-
atore and Schaerf (Liberatore & Schaerf 1998) we pro-
pose the following two merging operations on epistemic
states.
Definition 0.2 1. Let ΦEls(u) = 2min
E(u) if ΦEi (u) =
ΦEj (u) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ |E|, and Φ
E
ls(u) = 2min
E(u) + 1
otherwise. Then ∆ls(E)(u) = Φ
E
ls(u)−min(Φ
E
ls).
2. Let ΦERls(u) = Ω
seq≤(E)
⊑lex
(sE≤(u)). Then ∆Rls(E)(u) =
ΦERls(u)−min(Φ
E
Rls).
✷
Figure 2 contains a pictorial representation of ∆ls and
figure 3 a pictorial representation of ∆Rls. It can easily
be shown that ∆Rls is a refined version of ∆ls. Both
satisfy (E1)-(E6) and (Comm), neither satisfies (Maj),
and only ∆Rls satisfies (KP6). Moreover, ∆ls satisfies
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Figure 3: A representation of the merging operation
∆Rls The number in a cell represents the numbers that
the appropriate merging operation assigns to the inter-
pretations contained in that cell before normalisation.
(Arb) but ∆Rls does not. So, while both are valid merg-
ing operations, ∆Rls should not be seen as an arbitation
operation.
Next we consider two merging operations that are
generalisations of the δmax and δGmax operations of
Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez. The former was inspired
by an example of Revesz’s model-fitting operations
(Revesz 1987).
Definition 0.3 1. Let ΦEmax(u) = max
E(u). Then
∆max(E)(u) = Φ
E
max(u)−min(Φ
E
max).
2. Let ΦEGmax(u) = Ω
seq≥(E)
⊑lex
(sE≥(u)). Then
∆Gmax(E)(u) = Φ
E
Gmax(u)−min(Φ
E
Gmax).
✷
Figure 4 contains a pictorial representation of ∆max and
figure 5 a pictorial representation of ∆Gmax. Both sat-
isfy (E1)-(E6), neither satisfies (Maj), and only ∆Gmax
satisfies (KP6). Moreover, ∆max satisfies (Arb), but
∆Gmax does not. So, analogous to the case above,
both are valid merging operations but ∆Gmax should
not be seen as an arbitation operation. The fact that
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Figure 4: A representation of the merging operation
∆max. The number in a cell represents the numbers
that the appropriate merging operation assigns to the
interpretations contained in that cell before normalisa-
tion.
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Figure 5: A representation of the merging operation
∆Gmax. The number in a cell represents the numbers
that the appropriate merging operation assigns to the
interpretations contained in that cell before normalisa-
tion.
we do not regard ∆Gmax as an arbitration operation is
in conflict with the view of Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez
who regard δGmax as an arbitration operation on knowl-
edge bases even though it does not satisfy (arb). Con-
versely, Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez do not regard δmax
as a merging operation on knowledge bases since it fails
to satisfy (KP6). But we regard it as a valid arbitra-
tion operation since it satisfies the postulates (E1)-(E6),
(Comm) and (Arb).
Consensus
In this section we consider the idea of a consensus op-
eration, where agreement on the ranking of interpre-
rations, instead of the ranking itself, is of overriding
importance.
Definition 0.4 For s ∈ seq(E), let
dE(s) =
|E|∑
i=1
|E|∑
j=i+1
|si − sj|
where si denotes the ith element of s.
1. Define the total preorder ⊑ on seq(E) as follows: s ⊑
t iff dE(s) ≤ dE(t). Let ΦEcons(u) = Ω
seq(E)
⊑ (s
E(u)).
Then ∆cons(E)(u) = Φ
E
cons(u)−min(Φ
E
cons).
2. Define the total preorder ⊑ on seq≤(E) as follows:
s ⊑ t iff dE(s) < dE(t) or (dE(s) = dE(t) and s ⊑lex
t). Now, let ΦERcons(u) = Ω
seq≤(E)
⊑ (s
E
≤(u)). Then
∆Rcons(E)(u) = Φ
E
Rcons(u)−min(Φ
E
Rcons).
✷
Figure 6 contains a pictorial representation of ∆cons and
figure 7 a pictorial representation of ∆Rcons. We do not
regard these two operations as suitable candidates for
merging, primarily because both fail to satisfy (E3) and
(E4). Both satisfy (Unit), though. The problem with
these consensus operations seems to be that they place
too strong an emphasis on agreement and do not take
the ranking of interpretations seriously enough.
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Figure 6: A representation of the merging operation
∆cons. As usual, the number in a cell represents the
numbers that the appropriate merging operation as-
signs to the interpretations contained in that cell before
normalisation.
Majority
We consider the following two majority operations.
Definition 0.5 For s ∈ seq(E), let
sumE(s) =
|E|∑
i=1
si
where si is the ith element of s.
1. Let ΦEΣ(u) = sum
E(sE(u)). Then ∆Σ(E)(u) =
ΦEΣ(u)−min(Φ
E
Σ).
2. Define the total preorder ⊑ on seq(E) as follows:
s ⊑ t iff sumE(s) < sumE(t) or
(sumE(s) = sumE(t) and dE(s) ≤ dE(t)). Now,
let ΦERΣ(u) = Ω
seq(E)
⊑ (s
E(u)). Then ∆RΣ(E)(u) =
ΦERΣ(u)−min(Φ
E
RΣ).
✷
Figure 8 contains a pictorial representation of ∆Σ and
figure 9 a pictorial representation of ∆RΣ. ∆Σ is an
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Figure 7: A representation of the merging operation
∆Rcons. As usual, the number in a cell represents the
numbers that the appropriate merging operation as-
signs to the interpretations contained in that cell before
normalisation.
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Figure 8: A representation of the merging operation
∆Σ. As usual, the number in a cell represents the num-
bers that the appropriate merging operation assigns to
the interpretations contained in that cell before normal-
isation.
appropriate generalisation of an example by Lin and
Mendelzon (Lin & Mendelzon ). It was independently
proposed by Revesz (Revesz 1993) as an example of
weighted model fitting. The idea is simply to obtain
the new plausibility ranking of an interpretation by
summing the plausibility rankings given by the different
epistemic states. ∆RΣ is ∆Σ refined by using consen-
sus. Both ∆Σ and ∆RΣ satisfy (E1)-(E4), (Comm) and
(Maj), and neither satisfies (Arb). But while ∆Σ sat-
isfies (E5)-(E6) and (KP5)-(KP6) as well, ∆RΣ does
not.
Non-commutative merging
Thus far we have restricted ourselves to the construc-
tion of commutative merging operations – i.e., satis-
fying (Comm) – but a complete description of merging
ought to take into account constructions such as that of
Nayak (Nayak 1994), in which the merging of two epis-
temic states is obtained by a lexicographic refinement
of one by the other. We present here a generalised ver-
sion of Nayak’s proposal. For this case the epistemic
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Figure 9: A representation of the merging operation
∆RΣ. As usual, the number in a cell represents the
numbers that the appropriate merging operation as-
signs to the interpretations contained in that cell before
normalisation.
states in an epistemic list are assumed to be ranked ac-
cording to reliability. That is, given an epistemic list
E = [ΦE1 , . . . ,Φ
E
|E|], Φ
E
i is at least as reliable as Φ
E
j iff
i ≤ j.
Definition 0.6 Let ΦElex(u) = Ω
seq(E)
⊑lex
(sE(u)). Then
∆lex(E)(u) = Φ
E
lex(u)−min(Φ
E
lex). ✷
∆lex does not satisfy (Comm), but it satisfies (E1)-
(E6), as well as (KP5)-(KP6). By exploiting the non-
commutativity of ∆lex, both (Arb) and (Maj) can be
phrased in a way to ensure that ∆lex fails to satisfy
them.
Merging and infobases
Our description of merging uses a representation of epis-
temic states as functions assigning a plausibility ranking
to the interpretations of L, but where do these plausibil-
ity rankings come from? One way in which to generate
them is by using the infobases of Meyer (Meyer 1999).
An infobase is a finite list of wffs. Intuitively it is a
structured representation of the beliefs of an agent with
a foundational flavour. It is assumed that every wff in
an infobase is obtained independently. Meyer uses an
infobase to define a total preorder on U , which is then
used to perform belief change. However, we can also
use an infobase to define an epistemic state. The idea
is to consider the number of times that an interpreta-
tion occurs as a model of one of the wffs in an infobase:
the more it occurs, the higher its plausibility ranking.
Definition 0.7 For u ∈ U , define the IB-number uIB
of u as the number of elements α in an infobase IB such
that 2 α and u ∈M(α), and let
max(IB) = max{uIB | u ∈ U}.
Now we define the epistemic state associated with IB
as follows: for u ∈ U,ΦIB(u) = max(IB)− uIB . ✷
Observe that the knowledge base associated with an
epistemic state ΦIB is always consistent, regardless of
whether the wffs in IB are jointly consistent. We show
that infobases seem to provide a natural setting in
which to apply merging.
Firstly, define an infobase list EB = [IB1, . . . , IB |EB |]
as a finite non-empty list of infobases and let EEB de-
note the epistemic list [ΦIB1 , . . . ,ΦIB |E| ] of epistemic
states associated with the infobases occurring in EB .
Then it can be verified that ∆Σ(E
EB ) = ΦIB where
IB =
⊔|EB|
i=1 IB i.
Secondly, Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez (Konieczny &
Pino-Pe´rez 1998) give a convincing example to show
that we may sometimes want to include, as models
of δ(e), interpretations other than the models of the
knowledge bases in e. Below is a scaled down version
of their example.
Example 0.8 We want to speculate on the stock ex-
change and we ask two equally reliable financial ex-
perts about two shares. Let the atom p denote the fact
that share 1 will rise and q the fact that share 2 will
rise. The first expert says that both shares will rise:
φ1 = p ∧ q, while the second one believes that both
shares will fall: φ2 = ¬p ∧ ¬q. Intuitively it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that both experts are right (and
wrong) about exactly one share, although we don’t
know which share in either case. That is, we require
the result of the merging of these two knowledge bases
to be such that M(δ([φ1] ⊔ [φ2])) = {10, 01}.
2 Observe
that M(δ([φ1] ⊔ [φ2])) * M(φ1) ∪M(φ2). ✷
An analysis of this example shows that both experts
are assumed to make an implicit assumption of inde-
pendence of the performance of the shares. Thus the
beliefs of the first expert is best expressed as the in-
fobase IB1 = [p, q] and the beliefs of the second expert
as the infobase IB2 = [¬p,¬q]. The epistemic states
obtained from these two infobases are: ΦIB1(11) =
0,ΦIB1(10) = ΦIB1(01) = 1,ΦIB1(00) = 2, and
ΦIB2(00) = 0,ΦIB2(10) = ΦIB2(01) = 1,ΦIB2(11) = 2.
It can be verified that ∆max(E
EB ) = ∆Gmax(E
EB ) =
∆RΣ(E
EB ) = Φ, where EB = [IB1, IB2], Φ(10) =
Φ(01) = 0 and Φ(11) = Φ(00) = 1. So ∆RΣ, ∆max
and ∆Gmax yield the results corresponding to our intu-
ition for this example.
Conclusion
The merging operations we have constructed provide
evidence that (E1)-(E4) may be regarded as basic pos-
tulates for merging operations on epistemic states. Fur-
thermore, we regard (Arb) as an appropriate postulate
for the subclass of arbitration operations, (Maj) for the
subclass of majority operations, and (Comm) for the
subclass of commutative merging operations. The sta-
tus of (E5) and (E6) is less clear. While all but one of
the valid merging operations we have considered satisfy
both, the fact that ∆RΣ does not, suggests that they
are not as universally applicable as (E1)-(E4). Perhaps
they should be seen as picking out particular subclasses
of merging operations in the way that (Arb), (Maj) and
(Comm) do.
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